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BANK HELD LIABLE TO CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGOR
FOR MECHANICS' LEINS RESULTING FROM
NEGLIGENT DISBURSEMENT OF
CONSTRUCTION LOAN
Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman
114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713 (1961)
Heman executed an $11,000 construction mortgage to the North Akron
Savings and Loan Association, hereafter called the Bank, to finance the
construction of a house. The total cost of the house and lot was $17,500. The
mortgage was recorded before the commencement of construction,1 and con-
tained provisions required of the type of mortgage contemplated by Ohio
Revised Code section 1311.14.2 The Bank required Heman to deposit $5,500
which was held in escrow with the $11,000 provided by the mortgage. An
officer of the Bank orally assured Heman that the Bank "would take care of
things" for him. After disbursement of all the funds and payment of the
entire contract price, it was discovered that mechanics' liens had attached to
Heman's property. The action in the instant case was brought to foreclose a
mechanic's lien. All lien claimants were made parties. The Bank prayed for a
judgment against Heman on the mortgage, and Heman cross-petitioned
against the Bank for the sum he was compelled to pay for the construction
of the house which exceeded $17,500.3 The court of common pleas found the
mortgage to be the first and best lien on the property. The court also found
valid mechanics' liens totaling $5170.39. Since the full contract price of
$17,500 had already been paid out, the mechanics' liens represented costs
in excess of the contract price. The court held that the Bank was Heman's
paid agent, and found that the Bank was liable in the amount of $5170.39.
The court found that the Heman mortgage was within the purview of sec-
tion 1311.14 because it was a construction mortgage containing the provisions
required by the section. 4 The court further held that the failure of the
1 Brief for Appellee, pp. 7-8, in opposition to a motion to certify the record from
the court of appeals. Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, 114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713
(1961).
2 Mortgages contemplated by Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.14 must contain the correct
name and address of the mortgagee, and a covenant between the mortgagor and mort-
gagee authorizing the mortgagee to do all things provided to be done by the mortgagee
under the section. Falls Lumber Co. v. Herman, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 337, 342, 183 N.E.2d 265,
269 (C.P. 1960), aff'd, 114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713 (1961); Rider v. Crobaugh,
100 Ohio St. 88, 97-99, 125 N.E. 130, 132-33 (1919); In re Williams, 252 F. 924, 929
(NJ). Ohio 1918).
3 The discrepancy between the amount in the hands of the Bank, $16,500, and
the total contract price, $17,500, is not explained. However, since there seems to be no
question that the entire contract price was paid before the instant case arose, it is fair
to say that Heman cross-petitioned for the sum he was compelled to pay in excess
of the contract price.
4 The Ohio mechanics' lien laws provide protection for the rights of mechanics
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Bank to comply with section 1311.045 of the mechanics' lien laws was the
proximate cause of Heman's loss. 6 The Bank appealed, but the court of
appeals affirmed. A motion to certify the record was overruled by the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
The instant case is the first Ohio decision holding a construction mort-
gagee liable to a construction mortgagor for costs in excess of the contract
price. The nonfiduciary nature of the morgagee-mortgagor relationship ex-
plains the paucity of authority.7 The collateral agency theory8 appears to be
the crux of the holding.9 However, the opinion is misleading in several
respects: (1) The court's consideration of the mechanics' lien laws was
unnecessary in deciding the Bank's liability; 10 (2) and the opinion may sanc-
tion the unauthorized practice of law. The issue of unauthorized practice
lenors, owners, and mortgagors. Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.14 was enacted specifically to
protect the priority of mortgages recorded after commencement of construction. Infra
note 18. The wording of the section reveals a conscious effort not to confuse the power
given the mortgagee to protect his priority with an obligation to protect the owner.
Infra note 19.
5 Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.04 gives the owner immunity from being compelled to pay
any greater amount than he contracted to pay the original contractor, provided he complies
with its provisions. Magrish, "Disbursement of Ohio Construction Mortgage Loans,"
12 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1936).
6 Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, supra note 2, at 346, 183 N.E.2d at 270.
7 Restatement (Second), Agency §§ 13, comment b; 14 (H) (1958).
8 ftis v. Gentilly, 234 Iowa 689, 13 N.W.2d 699 (1944). The construction mort-
gagee orally agreed to obtain receipted bills from subcontractors before disbursing the
funds. All the disbursements were made on the written order of the owner which the
owner signed after the bank assured him it was all right to do so. The mortgagee was
held liable for the cost of mechanics' liens above the contract price when he disbursed
the money without procuring the receipted bills. The Iowa court said that liability
rested on a collateral agency which was distinct from and independent of the mortgage.
A collateral agency was the basis of liability in the Ohio decision of Painter v. Twins-
burg Banking Co., 84 Ohio App. 418, 87 N.E.2d 502 (1949). The mortgagee orally
agreed to insure the mortgaged property. Under the written provisions of the mortgage,
it was the mortgagor's duty to insure. When fire destroyed the mortgaged property,
the court held that the mortgagee had become the agent of the mortgagor for the
purpose of obtaining the insurance, and upon failing to do so, the mortgagee was
responsible for the loss.
9 The court in the instant case speaks of the duty of the Bank with reference to the
money belonging to Heman (as distinguished from that loaned to Heman under the
mortgage) as "much like that of a trustee engaged to hold and disburse funds of the
trust estate." However, no distinction is made between the duty created by the collateral
agency and that arising from disbursement of Heman's funds. The question arises
whether either alone would support the holding in the instant case. It is interesting to
note that the judgment against the Bank did not exceed Heman's deposit.
10 Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, p. 7. Counsel on behalf of Heman states, "It
really makes no difference as between the Bank and the Hemans whether or not this
was the type of loan that was subject to the provisions of R.C. 1311.14." The appellee
argued that the Bank's liability resulted from the disbursal of funds belonging to Heman
and from a collateral agency.
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of law is not mentioned in the opinion." However, the court impliedly in-
dorsed the agency, and held that the Bank should have protected Heman by
exercising the powers of section 1311.04.12
The court determined that section 1311.14 of the mechanics' lien laws
applied to the Heman mortgage. This holding is questionable. The term
"(construction mortgage" applies to any mortgage executed for construction
purposes whether or not the mortgage is technically a construction mortgage
under section 1311.14.13 Section 1311.14 contemplates only those mortgages
recorded after commencement of construction,14 and only protects the pri-
ority of mortgages when they contain the provisions required by that sec-
tion.'r The Heman mortgage contained section 1311.14 provisions, but they
were surplusage because the mortgage was recorded before the commencement
of construction. 16 Furthermore, priority of a construction mortgage can be
preserved under section 1311.14 only by disbursing funds according to its
provisions. The court of common pleas found that the Bank did not disburse
funds in accordance with section 1311.14, but still held that the Bank had
the first and best lien on Heman's property.17 These contradictory findings,
coupled with the history'8 and wording 19 of section 1311.14, substantiate
1 Counsel on behalf of the Bank, in defense of the Bank's inaction, argued that
performance of the agency would have constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
Brief for the Appellant, p. 14, in support of a motion to certify the record from the
court of appeals, Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, supra note 1.
12 The court of appeals sustained the conclusion of the common pleas court that
the Bank had agreed to protect Heman from claims which would increase the cost
beyond the contract price. The court stated that the Bank "holds itself out to the
community as skilled in conducting all phases of such transactions. This Bank surely
knew the necessary procedure to preclude the establishment of mechanics' liens upon
the house being constructed herein. Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.04 sets out in detail how
money is to be paid out in cases such as we have herein, in order to prevent the ob-
taining of mechanic's liens by those supplying material or doing work on a construction
project such as we have in this matter before us." Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, supra
note 1, at 264-265, 181 N.E.2d at 715. (Emphasis added.)
13 12 U. Cinc. L. Rev., supra note 5, at 1.
14 In re Taylor, 20 F.2d 8, 9 (6th Cir. 1927); Rider v. Crobaugh, supra note 2, at
100, 125 N.E. at 134.
15 Cases cited supra note 2; Fishman v. Helwig, 43 Ohio App. 530, 183 N.E. 883
(1932).
16 But see Taylor, 16 F.2d 303 (D.C. Ohio 1926), modified, 20 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1927); See Rider v. Crobaugh, supra note 2, at 98-100, 125 N.E. at 133; 12 U. Cinc. L.
Rev., supra note 5, at 6-7.
17 Brief for Appellant, Appendix B. p. 2, supra note 11.
Is Prior to 1913, the recording act, Ohio Gen. Code § 8542 (now Ohio Rev. Code
§ 5301.23) gave priority to all mortgages recorded before mechanics' liens. This was
unfair to laborers and material men. In 1913 the mechanics' lien laws were amended
giving priority to all mechanics' liens over any mortgage recorded after commencement
of construction. 103 Ohio Laws 369, 376 (1913), amending Ohio Gen. Code § 8321
(now Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.13). This requirement was too harsh on lending institutions.
In 1915, a new section of the mechanics' lien laws, the predecessor of present § 1311.14,
was adopted empowering a construction mortgagee to obtain priority in spite of recording
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the suggestion that the section is not applicable to the instant case.
The court held that the Bank's duty to Heman required it to comply
with section 1311.04, and that failure to do so was negligent conduct. It is
clear that the Bank did not specifically agree to protect Heman from loss by
disbursing in accordance with section 1311.04. There are other methods by
which this duty could have been discharged, 20 e.g., the method suggested
by Iltis v. Gentilly.21 Section 1311.04 empowers a bank, as a mortgagee,
to exercise its provisions.22 However, a bank is entitled to exercise these
powers only to protect the priority of its mortgage lien and not for the pro-
tection of the owner,23 for had the Bank carried out the duties of the agency
found by the court in the instant case, it would have been engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.24
The practice of law includes generally all advice to a client and all
action taken for him by his attorney in matters connected with the law.25
subsequent to commencement of construction. 106 Ohio Laws 522, 531 Ohio G. C.
§ 8321-1 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.14). See Rider v. Crobaugh, supra note 2, at 98,
99, 125 N.E. at 133.
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 1311.14 states:
Sections 1311.01 to 1311.68, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not require the
mortgagee to ascertain by affidavit or otherwise the respective claims of con-
tractors, subcontractors, laborers or materialmen, or to determine priorities
among lien claimants.
The mortgagee is not responsible for a mistake of the owner in determining
priorities, or for any failure of the payee properly to distribute funds paid on
the written order of the owner.
While § 1311.14 seems to relieve the mortgagee from using the provisions of § 1311.04,
it does not deny such use. 12 U. Cinc. L. Rev., supra note 5, at 18.
20 Gosline, "The Ohio Mechanics' Lien Law," 1 Ohio St. L.J. 198, 205 (1935).
The author suggests that the owner can be protected by obtaining waivers, causing
the general contractor to post an indemnity bond, or deferring payment of part of the
contract price until sixty days after the house is completed. In the instant case, the
general contractor and the Bank had done business together for many years. It appears
that the Bank had extensive control of the financial arrangements, for at the request
of the Bank, the general contractor submitted a proposed schedule of payments to the
Bank for approval. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 1.
21 Supra note 8.
22 When § 1311.14 was enacted to enable construction mortgagees to protect the
priority of mortgages recorded after commencement of construction, supra note 18,
§ 1311.04 was also amended to empower mortgagees to use its provisions. 106 Ohio Laws
522 (1915). It has been suggested that it was the intention of the drafters that mortgages
which failed to qualify for the protection of § 1311.14 because of failure to include the
required provisions, supra note 2, could be protected by the exercise of § 1311.04
powers. Infra note 23. 12 U. Cinc. L. Rev., supra note 5, at 19.
23 Where a mortgage is recorded after construction commences, exercising the pro-
visions of § 1311.04 will protect the priority of the mortgage lien to the same extent
that it protects the owner, and accrual of the benefit to the owner would be irrelevant.
24 This conclusion is not supported by direct authority, but notes 25-29, infra, give
it credence.
25 In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707, 719, 370 P.2d 242, 248 (1962); State Bar Ass'n
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The legal nature of the service and not its complexity determines whether
or not the performance of the service constitutes the practice of law. 0 Coun-
sel employed by a corporation or an association may only furnish legal
services which are beneficial in the prosecution of the corporation's approved
business.27 A corporation cannot render legal services to others. 28 The com-
mon pleas court in the instant case found that Heman had a right to rely
upon the Bank to advise him when to give his order for disbursement of
funds.29 If the Bank had expressly undertaken to give such advice, it could
not have been responsibly given without prior appraisal of Heman's con-
tract with the contractor and the legal validity of the affidavits and certificates
releasing all claims of materialmen and subcontractors.3 0 The performance
of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234-235, 140 A.2d 863, 870 (1958):
"The practice of law . . . embraces giving legal advice on a large variety of subjects
and the preparation of legal instruments covering an extensive field." See also Land Title
Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 28, 193 N.E. 630, 652 (1934).
20 State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 42, 50,
144 A.2d 347, 351 (1958).
27 Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 57, 273 S.W.2d 408, 413
(1954).
28 State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962) ; Judd v.
City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 88, 12 N.E.2d 288, 293 (1937); Land Title
Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, supra note 25, at 30, 193 N.E. at 653; In re Battelle
Memorial Institute, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 168, 170 N.E.2d 774, 782 (1960). In State Bar
Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., supra note 25, at 234, 140 A.2d at 870,
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, after reviewing the qualities required of an
attorney, stated: "Only a human being can conform to these exacting requirements.
Artificial creations such as corporations or associations cannot meet these prere-
quisites .... "
29 It must be remembered that the Bank at no time intended or apprehended the
agency relationship. The court inferred the agency on the basis of the Bank's statement,
inzfra note 31, the Bank's superior knowledge concerning construction loans and the
mechanics' lien law, and its holding out to the community that it possessed such
knowledge. The common pleas court remarked ". . . The Court takes the view that
when the Defendant Bank called to acquire Reman's consent it impliedly represented
to the Hemans that all things were done that reasonably should have been done to
protect Heman's interest from mechanics' liens and the Hemans had the right to rely
upon this premise, which they did. And if such were not done by the Defendant Bank,
then the Bank owed the Hemans the duty of telling them so, otherwise as in this case,
the oral consent by Heman authorizing payment meant nothing as protecting the Bank."
Falls Lumber Co., v. Heman, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 337, 345, 183 N.E.2d 265, 270 (C.P.
1960).
30 Drafting affidavits was generally held to be the practice of law in In re Small
Home & Land Owners Federation, Civil No. 360395, C.P. Cuyahoga Cty, Ohio, Sept. 7,
1934. Drafting instruments which release legal rights for or without pay was held to be
the practice of law in State Bar of Oklahoma v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Arnett,
Dist. Ct., Ellis Cty, Okla., 1936. Excerpts of both these opinions are found in Brand,
Unauthorized Practice Decisions 268, 545 (1937). Since drafting affidavits or releases
of legal rights is the practice of law, advice on the legal significance of these instruments
is quite likely the practice of law.
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of these services, being for Heman's benefit and not for the benefit of the
Bank, very likely would have constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
The instant case is a warning to lending institutions to exercise caution
when negotiating construction loans. Casual assurances made to prospective
construction mortgagors may create collateral agencies which may amount to
the unauthorized practice of law.3 1 Written consent to pay out funds should
always be obtained.32 However, written consent alone may not prevent a
court from implying a collateral agency where circumstances parallel those
of the instant case.33 Therefore, it is desirable that requests for written
consent to pay contain notice of the mechanic's lien hazard, and that the
written consent expressly acknowledge a bank's nonliability.3 The collateral
agency may be avoided most effectively by insisting that the construction
mortgagor employ private legal counsel. The court will be hard-pressed
to find a lending institution responsible for protecting a construction mort-
gagor from mechanics' liens when the construction mortgagor has employed
private legal counsel for that purpose.
31 Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, p. 4. The Bank told Heman "It would take
care of things" and "You let us handle and pay out this money and everything will
be all right."
32 This is particularly true if the mortgage is one contemplated by Ohio Rev. Code
§ 1311.14. See quote, supra note 19.
33 Supra notes 8 & 29.
34 Supra note 29. Note especially the court's reference to the Bank's duty to tell
Heman that no steps had been taken to protect him from mechanics' liens.
